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NOTES AND COMMENTS
has free power to act to secure the infant's rights.2' The purpose of
the next friend is to supply the want of capacity in the minor and to
supply someone legally responsible for the costs. 22 One case, at least,
has said that it is the next friend and not the infant who decides upon
the policy to bring suit.
23
Nothing appears in the principal case to indicate that the mother
as next friend was not acting in her judgment for the best interests
of the plaintiff. If the infant has not the capacity to bring an action
in the first place, his opinion or judgment that the suit should be ter-
minated should not be grounds for dismissal of the action.
The statute gives control to the court over the next friend be-
cause the Court does not appoint the next friend in the first instance.
But, where a proper person is acting in the interest of the infant,
the statute does not contemplate that the court shall substitute its
judgment for that of a jury in determining the merits of the litigation.
It is unfair to infants as a class to give a defendant this added de-
fense which he would not have had if the plaintiff had been a person
of legal age.
S. L. W.
Equity
BALANCING THE INCONVENIENCES IN TRESPASS AND
NUISANCES CASES IN OHIO.
The court of equity is a court of discretion. A doctrine vhich
is sometimes used to guide that discretion is the principle of bal-
ancing the equities or balancing the inconveniences. Its purpose is
to avoid the issuance of injunctions which would operate oppressively,
or inequitably, or contrary to the justice of the case. Thus, a plain-
tiff who is suffering irreparable damages, who has no adequate rem-
edy at law, and whose right to an injunction is clear, may, neverthe-
less, be denied injunctive relief, if equity, after balancing the
inconveniences, finds the equities of the case with the defendant.
SRoberts v. Vaughn, 142 Term. 361, 219 S. W. 1034, 9 A. L. R1. 1528 (1919); Re
Moore, 269 U. S. 490, 52 L. ed. 004, 28 S. Ct. &Q5, 14 Ann. Cas. 1164 (1908). (Next
friend may select the tribunal.)
"Bertinelli v. Galoni, 331 Pa. 73, 200 Ad. 58, 118 A. L. R. 398 (1938); See Ouro
G. C. 11248.
3 Swope v. Swope, 173 Ala. 157, 55 So. 418, Ann. Cas. 1914 A 937 (1911).
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As applied to preliminary hearings, the balancing-of-equities
doctrine is properly a ruling principle governing the exercise of
judicial discretion. On such a hearing, it is clearly the duty of the
court to balance the hardships, and, if the injuries resulting to the
defendant greatly exceed any benefits which will accrue to the plain-
tiff from the temporary relief, it should be refused.' Ohio is in ac-
cord with this firmly established rule as to temporary hearings as
is indicated by a statement from the Supreme Court that "It is a
settled rule of courts of chancery in acting on applications for in-
junctions to regard the comparative injuries which would be sus-
tained by the defendant if an injunction were granted, and by the
complainant, if refused . . . If a legal right is doubtful, the court
is always reluctant to take a course which may result in material
injury to either party." 2 In many different fact patterns the lower
courts have likewise balanced the injuries on application for pre-
liminary relief. Thus, enforcement of a doubtful statute, pending
constitutional hearing, has been restrained rather than preventing
the operation of plaintiff's chemical plant;3 manufacturing plants,
which were interfering with complainant's health and comfort were
closed;4 and obstructions which did not totally inconvenience the
plaintiff were not compelled to be removed by the defendant."
Frequently the convenience of the public has influenced the court's
decision.6 Regardless of the fact situation, the principle in favor
of balancing is universally present.
TRESPASS CASES
On applications for permanent injunctions, there is no such
161 A. L. R. 925, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 881, CLARx, EguiTy §212.
2 State ex Rel, Cleveland v. Court of Appeals, 104 Ohio St. 96, 135 N. E. 377 (1922).
a Smith Agri. Chemical Co. v. Calvert, 8 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 361, 19 Ohio D. (N. P.)
571 (1908).
'Amlung v. Lang, 22 Ohio D. (N. P.) 61, 8 Ohio L. R. 286 (1910).
Harrison v. Craighead, 7 Ohio Dec. Rep. 634, 4 V. L. Bull. 500 (1879).
Fogarty v. Cincinnati, 7 Ohio N. P. 100, 9 Ohio D (N. P.) 753 (1900); Occo
Realty Co. v. New York C. & St. L. R. Co. 33 Ohio App. 414, 196 N. E. 719 (1929);
Ritter v. Cleveland S. L. R. R. 17 Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 4, 41 Ohio C. C. 678 (1903); Cin.
Consol. St. R. Co. v. Cincinnati, 7 Ohio Dec. Rep. 125, 1 IV. L. Bull. 134 (1876).
For other cases dealing with the principle on temporary injunction, see, Steiner v.
Hennon, S Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 314, 17 Ohio D. (N. P.) 585 (1907); Gould v. Chesapeake
& 0. R. Co., 10 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 129, 21 Ohio D. (N. P.) 733 (1910); Fellows v.
Walkers, 6 Ohio F. D. 362, 39 Fed. 651 (1889); Great Southern Hotel v. McClain, 3
Ohio N. P. 247, 4 Ohio D. (N. P.) 309 (1895); Voodrow v. Geneva Coal & Min. Co.,
17 Ohio App. 56 (1922); Sedaris v. Riley, 27 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 215 (1928); Dissette
v. Lowrie, 6 Ohio N. P. 392, 9 Ohio D. (N. P.) 545 (1899).
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uniformity of decision in Ohio. In the trespass cases, if the com-
plainant's right is clear and the defendant's trespass such that there
is no adequate remedy at law, the prevailing view in most juris-
dictions is that the equities should not be balanced. Although the
Supreme Court of Ohio has rarely spoken on the point involved,
and the lower court cases are likewise restricted in number, a review
of them indicates that in a slight majority of situations, particularly
if no great public inconvenience would result, the courts refuse to
balance the equities and grant injunctive relief.
A most outspoken opinion to this effect was handed down in a
circuit court case where an injunction was sought against defendant
telephone company's placing of poles and stringing of wires on
plaintiff's property. The court said, "Plaintiff's right to this remedy
is not to be measured by the extent of the injury, nor by the neces-
sity or convenience of the company... that some private individual
or company may -be inconvenienced, or that the public may be pre-
vented from enjoying a luxury is not the plea which takes from a man
his property rights without compensation and gives them to another
or to the public." In a similar case the Supreme 'Court granted
the injunction, implying that if plaintiff's rights were clearly estab-
lished, relief should be forthcoming as a matter of right, subject
only to equity's omnipresent discretion.8
However, the Supreme Court affirmed, without opinion, a case
wherein complainant sought to prevent a railroad from laying tracks
and building an overhead bridge which would cut off his light and
depreciate the value of his property. The lower court had said,
"where a perpetual injunction against construction and operation
of tracks is concerned, equity can only acquire jurisdiction if, among
other things, it would appear that upon consideration of relative
expense and inconvenience, an injunction would not be inequitable
or oppressive to the defendant or the public." 9 This case is typical
of several others in which the court refused the injunction, ostensibly,
because plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law or because his
damages were not irreparable, and yet found it desirable to speak of
the oppressive injuries which would be suffered by the public were
7 Alantell v. Bucyrus Tel. Co., 20 Ohio C. C. 345, 11 Ohio C. D. 274 (1900).
"Callen v. Col's Edison Elec. Light, 66 Ohio St. 166, 64 N. E. 141 (1902).
9 Smedes v. Cincinnati Inter. R. Co., 4 Ohio L. R. 44, 16 Ohio D. 743 (1906), aff.
aithoiut opi1:ion, 81 Ohio 519 (1909).
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the injunction to be granted.10 This practice as indicative of an
effort by the Ohio courts, at least in some cases, to refrain from
deciding the cases on the balancing-of-equities doctrine, but yet,
apparently giving the principle considerable attention, especially if
the public is in a position to suffer by the ruling.
The cases are about evenly divid&d as to whether or not the
equities should be balanced in those situations where the defendant
has trespassed by building on plaintiff's property One court raled
that even though the defendant's encroachment did not interfere with
plaintiff's use of his property that the injunction should issue.""
Another case, on practically identical facts, held, "that if the damages
to the defendant by granting the injunction would greatly exceed
those of plaintiff if it were to be refused, then equity should not
afford relief." 12
In summary, it would appear that there is little agreement in
the lower courts as to the application of the doctrine in trespass
cases, but that they will most often balance the equities where the
public would be injured by the injunction. In the few instances
where the Supreme Court of Ohio has expressed itself on the prob-
lem it has refused to condone the principle.
NUISANCE CASES
On petitions for injunctions against nuisances, the Ohio courts,
including the Supreme Court, are apparently more willing to balance
the equities, although, as in the trespass cases, there is considerable
divergence of viewpoint. The most forceful decision directly sanc-
tioning the principles was an early Nisi Prius holding winch denied
relief against a manufacturing plant, the operation of which was
causing the escape of injurious gases. 3 In that case the court con-
sidered the size of the payroll, the number of men employed, the
value of the plant and the fact that the defendant was using the
-S C. & W. Turnip Co. v. Hamilton County, 5 Ohio N. P. 423. 7 Ohio D. 509 (1893);
Tol. Elec. St. R. Co. v. 'Tol. & R. Co., 7 Ohio N. P. 211, 1 Ohio D. 83 (1894); Cincinnati
Union Stock Yards Co. v. Cincinnati, i Ohio App. 452 (1913); Jackson v. Bellamy, i0
Ohio L. Abs. 700 (1931).
1 Young v. Thedieck, 8 Ohio App. 103, 28 Ohio C. A. 239 (1918).
12Foster v. Norton, 2 Ohio Dec. Rep. 390, 2 West. L. M. 583 (1896).
For other encroachment cases, see Quigley v. Fireproof Storage Co., 18 Ohio C. C.
(N. S.) 320, 33 Ohio C. D. 62 (1911); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Baum, 15 Ohio C. C.
(N. S.) 383, 33 Ohio C. C. 462, A. 78 Ohio St. 427, 85 N. E. 1128 (1908); Gold v.
Franz, 5 Ohio N. P. 205, 7 Ohio D. 334 (1898).
13Neuhs v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 5 Ohio N. P. 359, 8 Ohio D. (N. P.) 203 (1898).
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most modern methods of operation, and ruled that since the balance of
convenience was dearly with the defendant the injunction should
be refused. Other cases where the principle has been the basis for
the court's decision have most often dealt with situations wherein
the public would be materially harmed if the injunctions were
granted.14 In more cases than not, however, it has been the practice
of the courts to refuse to base their rulings on the doctrine of bal-
ancing the equities. Instead, they withhold the injunction because
of lack of equitable jurisdiction (usually because plaintiff's damages
are not irreparable or because his remedy at law is adequate) but,
at the same time, offer statements or implications which indicate
the weighing of comparative injuries. In an early Supreme Court
case 1 i where injunctive relief was being sought against noise ema-
nating from defendant's manufacturing plant, while the decision
rested on the presence of an adequate remedy at law, the court said
"Where destruction of a business would cause more hurt to the de-
fendant than help to the plaintiff, the injunction should be exercised
cautiously." In this case had the relief been granted, a large plant
would have been compelled to cease operations. Another court, while
not basing its holding on the doctrine, pointed out "What would
be the relative effect upon the parties? Would the granting of the
injunction entail much more injury to the defendant than benefit to
the plaintiff ? If so, the injunction should be refused and the parties
left to their action at law." 16 A further instance of the practice
of mentioning the principle, but allowing the decision to stand on
another ground, is afforded by a case wherein defendant's dam was
causing water to flow onto plaintiff's property.'7  In that case the
court denied relief, ostensibly because the plaintiff's right at law had
not been established, but probably for the equally important reason
that the comparative injuries resulting would be greater if the in-
junction were issued. It is interesting to note that one chancellor,
rather than merely stating that the petitioner's damages were not
irreparable, and withholding the injunction on that ground, definitely
" Standard Bag & Paper Co. v. Cleveland, 2 Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 111, 15 Ohio C. D.
380 (1903); Simondson v. Richardson, 2 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 170, 1 Ohio D. (N. P.)
33 (1904).
2SGoodall v. Crofton, 33 Ohio St. 271, 31 Am. Rep. 535 (1877); see also, Salem Iron
Co. v. Hyland, 74 Ohio St. 160 (1906).
a" Downs v. Greer Beatty Clay Co., 9 Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 345, 29 Ohio C. C. 328
(1906).
at McCord v. Iker, 12 Ohio 387 (1843).
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ruled that, in the determination of the irreparability of damages,
equity should decide, "if the conditions and effect is such as to be
irreparable in damages under all the circumstances of the case,
having in mind the character and location of defendant's premises,
the number of men employed, whether or not the plant is operated in
a modern manner and all other pertinent factors. 8 This holding
would seem to advocate a principle, very similar to balancing the
equities, to be used in determining the plaintiff's type of damages.
It may be worth while to suggest the possibility that other courts,
without mentioning it, have used this method of determination, and
so, in effect, balanced the inconveniences in deciding the plaintiff's
rights, instead of doing so after his rights were established. If such
be the case, it may be at least one reason why the Ohio courts have
been able to escape, for the most part, direct holdings on the prin-
ciple of balancing the equities.
The instances in which the principle has been repudiated are
restricted to lower court opinions. In Shaiw v. Queen City Forging
Co.,'" it was asserted, "it is not the duty to balance the inconveniences
that may be caused to the parties, and if a substantial legal right is
invaded, if the right and its violation is clear, an injunction will
issue regardless of consequences." In another case the plaintiff was
being damaged by smoke, soot, and cinders from the defendant's
use of coke ovens. 20 The court granted the injunction although it
meant closing the defendant's valuable plant. A decision definitely
disapproving the doctrine was rendered by a court which enjoined
the defendant from further operation of its garbage disposal plant
which was of substantial public benefit.
21
'CONCLUSION
It is difficult to make generalizations regarding balancing the
equities in Ohio. It is, however, evident that the principle is ac-
cepted more frequently in nuisance cases than in trespass cases, and
that it is more likely to receive the sanction of the courts in situa-
18 Bell v. Pollak Steel Co., 19 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 529 (1916).
1'9 10 Ohio Dec. 107, 7 Ohio N. P. 254 (1900). See Batsche v. Kisinger Co., 15 Ohio
D. (N. P.) 30 (1904); Gau v. Ley, 27 Ohio C. A. 1, 38 Ohio C. C. 235 (1916).
20 cClung v. North Bend Coal Co., 9 Ohio C. C. 259, 6 Ohio C. D. 243 (1895).
21 Reifsnyder v. Canton Fertilizer Chemical Co., 9 Ohio App. 161, 28 Ohio C. A. 577
(1918). See, Union Reduction Co. v. Story, 8 Ohio App. 381, 30 Ohio C. A. 252 (1917);
Munk v. Col's Sanitary Works, 7 Ohio N. P. 542, 5 Ohio D. (N. P.) 548 (1896), aff. 62
Ohio St. 640, 58 N. E. 1098 (1900).
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tions where the public is directly or indirectly involved. It is quite
obvious that the courts are not anxious to settle the law in this
respect as they refrain from passing on the principle whenever
possible. As a result, the status of the doctrine in Ohio is not
clearly established. Perhaps, however, this condition of the law
is not necessarily undesirable. In some jurisdictions the doctrine
has oscillated between acceptance and rejection. An instance of
such a practice is shown by two decidedly conflicting statements
from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. In 1868 the court ruled,
"It is elementary law, that in equity a decree is never of right but
of grace. Hence the chancellor will consider whether he would not
do a greater injury by enjoining than would result from refusing...
If in conscience the former should appear, he will refuse to enjoin." 22
Yet, only a quarter of a century later, the same court said, " . . .a
refusal of an injunction upon the ground that plaintiff cannot
suffer as great a loss from discontinuance of the nuisance as defend-
ant would from its interdiction would be as far removed from equity
as can be. There is to my mind no more offensive plea than that
by which one seeks to justify an act injurious to his neighbor on the
ground of its advantage to himself." 23 If the adoption of a definite
rule as to the principle of balancing the equities necessitates such
diametrically opposed viewpoints when only slightly different fact
patterns are being considered, perhaps the Ohio courts are prudent
in not definitely declaring the law, and thus being better able to base
their decisions on the particular facts of the case.
L. B. C.
Trusts
STATUS AND LIABILITY OF AN EXECUTOR WHO IS ALSO
A TRUSTEE.
Testator, by will, appointed his wife and one Nixon executors
of his estate, and specifically listed the acts they were authorized
to perform in that capacity. Testator also named his wife and
Nixon trustees of the residue of the estate for the benefit of the
deceased's children. The appointees qualified as executors and gave
"Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105, 98 Am. Dec. 202 (1868).
2 Evans v. Readin Chemical Fertilizing Co., 160 Pa. 209, 20 At. 702 (1894).
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